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1 Introduction
In many housing markets, the purchases of owner-occupied houses by individuals
who attempt to profit from buying low and selling high rather than for occupation
are commonplace. For a long time, anecdotal evidence abounds as to how the par-
ticipation of these specialist investors, who are popularly known as flippers in the
U.S., in the housing market can be widespread.1 More recently, empirical studies on
the housing market have began to more systematically document the extent to which
transactions in the housing market are motivated by a pure investment motive. No-
table contributions include Depken et al. (2009) and Bayer et al. (2011). A related
strand of investigation, which includes Rosen (2007), Shiller (2008), Wheaton and
Nechayev (2008), among others, focuses on the role played by the investment motive
in the housing market “bubble” in the U.S. in the late-1990s to the mid-2000s. A
common theme in the discussion is that housing market flipping is destabilizing. At
times, such sentiments are not uncommon among the public and policy makers in
many places.2
In contrast, dealers in the financial markets, who buy and sell securities for short-
term gains and profit the bid-ask spreads in the interim, are often hailed for their
role in providing liquidity to the market.3 If dealers in the financial market can help
improve market liquidity, there should certainly be ample room for the flippers in
the housing market to do just the same if not more, given that the housing market
appears far less liquid than the financial market.
The latter tendency, of course, is due to the fact that houses diﬀer from one
another along a large number of dimensions, and unlike many financial assets, are
traded without the benefit of an organized exchange. Beginning with Arnold (1989)
and Wheaton (1990), this recognition has prompted a sizeable literature on the appli-
1Out of the five transactions in a large developement in Hong Kong in August 2010, three were
reported to involve investors who buy in anticipation of short-term gains (September 10, 2010, Hong
Kong Economic Times). According to one industry insider, among all buyers of a new develop-
ment in Hong Kong recently, only about 60% are buying for own occupation (November 20, 2010,
Wenweipo).
2In the U.S. in particular, interest deductibility applies to the first and second homes only and
capital gains tax may only be exempted for properties sold after the first two years of purchase.
In recent times, the Chinese government has put in place severe restrictions on the ownership of
a second home in a number of cities. Moreover, in Beijing, individuals who have not lived in the
city for up to five years are barred from the purchase of an owner-occupied home altogether. See
“Beijing’s housing market bubbles,” September 27, 2007, The New York Times ; “Wenzhou investors
leave Beijing housing market,” February 28, 2011, CNTV. Similar measures were also in eﬀect in
Hong Kong, where since November 2010, housing units that are sold within two years of purchase
are subject to an extra 5-15% ad valorem transaction tax. See “Midland adds to jitters - over extra
stamp duty,” December 3, 2010, The Hong Kong Standard.
3Duﬀe et al (2005), Lagos and Rocheteau (2007), and Lagos et al. (2011) study the liquidity-
provision role of dealers in over-the-counter markets. Coughenour and Deli (2002) and Coughenour
and Saad (2004) presents empirical evidence on how market makers help provide liquidity in the
stock market.
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cation of the search and matching framework in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) first
developed for the labor market to study the determination of vacancy, turnover, sales
volume, price, among other variables, in the housing market.4 A common feature of
the models in this literature is that the agents are exclusively end-users. A buyer is a
household looking for a good match for occupation. A seller is a household which no
longer finds its old house a desirable place to live and is trying to sell it to someone
who finds it as such. There are no specialist investors or flippers around.
In this paper, we add specialist investors to a canonical housing market search
model to study how the presence of these flippers aﬀects price, turnover, vacancy,
transaction volume, and welfare. In our model, the central role played by these agents
is to facilitate the turnover of mismatched houses on behalf of end-user households.
A crucial assumption is that ordinary households cannot hold more than one house at
a time. The assumption, of course, can be justified by the usual liquidity constraint
argument. In this case, a household which desires to move because the old house
is no longer a good match must first sell it before the household can buy up a new
house. In the usual housing market search model, the household must wait out
a buyer who finds the old house a good match to arrive, which can be a lengthy
process, especially in a buyer’s market–one in which sellers outnumber buyers by a
significant margin. This opens up profitable opportunities for specialist investors to
just buy up the mismatched house at a discount in return for the time spent waiting
for the eventual end-user buyer to arrive on behalf of the original owner. Less obvious
is that mismatched homeowners could similarly prefer to sell quickly to flippers in
a seller’s market to capitalize on the high prices in such a market sooner, as we
shall show in the following. In either case, transaction volume, vacancy, and housing
price all increase with the extent of flippers’ presence in the market, whereas average
Time-On-the-Market (TOM) declines in the interim.
According to Bayer et al. (2011), flippers in the housing market can be novice in-
vestors who buy en masse in an up market in the belief that the market may continue
to go up and sell in panicky in a down market or can be sophisticated middlemen
whose activities help provide liquidity in both up and down markets. Implicit in
both popular discussions and previous studies on the investment motive in the hous-
ing market is that in reality the majority of flippers are more like novice investors
than sophisticated middlemen, and any liquidity the flippers may provide is at best
coincidental. If flippers as novice investors destabilize the market and flippers as so-
phisticated middlemen provide liquidity and help stabilize the market, on the whole,
the pure investment motive in the housing market may only end up serving to facil-
itate the formation of speculative bubbles. Our analysis, however, suggests that the
dichotomy may not be clear-cut. For tractability, we restrict attention to analyzing
the steady state of a housing market and any kinds of timing market movements and
speculative bubbles are ruled out by construction. Even so, wide swings in prices
4Notable examples include Williams (1995), Krainer (2001), Albrecht et. al. (2007), Diaz and
Jerez (2009), Piazzesi and Schneider (2009), Ngai and Tenreyro (2010), to name just a few.
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and transactions are distinct possibilities because multiple equilibrium is a natural
outcome in a frictional housing market with specialist investors. In one equilibrium,
flippers are numerous, prices are high, and turnover is rapid. In another equilibrium,
few transactions are intermediated, prices are moderate, and turnover is sluggish.
Thus, the participation of specialist investors in the housing market can be a double-
edged sword–on the one hand, the flippers help improve liquidity; on the other hand,
when the extent of their participation can be fickle, the housing market can become
more volatile as a result.
Our model has a number of readily testable implications. First, it trivially predicts
a positive cross-section relation between housing price and TOM–households can
either sell to specialist investors at a discount or to wait for a better oﬀer from
an end-user buyer to arrive–which agrees with the evidence reported in Merlo and
Ortalo-Magne (2004), Leung et al. (2002) and Genesove and Mayer (1997), among
others.5
An important goal of the recent housing market search and matching literature is
to understand the positive time-series correlation between housing price and trans-
action volume and the negative correlation between the two variables and average
TOM.6 In Kranier (2001), for instance, a positive but temporary preference shock
can give rise to higher prices and a greater volume of transaction, whereas Diaz and
Jerez’s (2009) analysis implies that an adverse shock to construction will shorten
TOM, and may possibly lead to higher prices and a greater volume of transaction.
The paper by Ngai and Tenreyro (2010) focuses on seasonal cycles in price and sales
and they argue that increasing returns in the matching technology play a key role in
generating such cycles. In these papers, the increase in sales should be accompanied
by a decline in vacancy–given that when a house is sold, it is sold to an end-user,
who will immediately occupy it, vacancy must decline, or at least remains unchanged.
Across steady-state equilibria, the same positive relation between price and transac-
tion volume and negative relation between the two variables and average TOM also
hold in our model. Specifically, with more houses sold to flippers, prices and sales
both increase, whereas houses on average stay on the market for a shorter period of
time. Unique to our model, however, is that vacancy tends to increase together with
prices and transaction volume if the increase in transaction volume is due to more
houses sold to flippers, who may then just leave them vacant for the time it takes for
the end-user buyers to arrive.
Figure 1 depicts the familiar positive housing price-transaction volume correla-
5Albrecht et al. (2007) emphasis another aspect of the results reported in Merlo and Ortalo-
Magne (2004), which is that downward price revisions are increasingly likely when a house spends
more and more time on the market.
6Stein (1995), who explains how the down-payment requirement plays a crucial role in amplifying
shocks, is an early non-search-theoretic explanation for the positive relation between price and sales.
Hort (2000), Leung et al. (2003), among others, provides recent evidence. Ho and Tse (2006) show
that the same relation holds in the cross section.
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Figure 1: Price and Transaction
tion for the U.S. for the 1991-I to 2010-IV time period.7 The usual housing market
search model predicts that vacancy should decline in the housing market boom in
the late-1990s to the mid-2000s and rise thereafter when the market collapses around
2007. Figures 2 and 3, however, show that any decline in vacancy is not apparent in
the boom.8 In fact, if there is any co-movement between vacancy on the one hand
and price and transaction on the other hand in the run-up to the peak of the housing
market boom in 2006, vacancy appears to have risen along with price and transac-
tion. True, vacancy does not appear to have fallen to follow the market collapse,
as predicted by our analysis. But this probably is a combined result of the massive
amounts of bank foreclosures and unsold new constructions in the market bust–two
forces absent in our analysis.
Insofar as the specialist investors in our model act as middlemen between the
original homeowners and the eventual end-user buyers, this paper contributes to the
7Housing Price is defined as the nominal house price, which is the transaction-based, seasonally-
adjusted house price index from OFHEO (http://www.fhfa.gov), divided by the CPI, from the
Federal Reserve Bank at St. Louis, seasonally-adjusted. We set Housing Price equal to 100 at
1991-I. Transaction is measured by the total sales in single-family homes, apartment condos, and
co-ops, normed by the stock of such units. The sales data are from Moody’s Analytics, whereas the
stock data are from the Bureau of Census’s CPS/HVS.
8Vacancy rate is obtained by dividing the number of vacant and for-sale-only housing units by
the stock of such units. The data are from the Bureau of Census’s CPS/HVS.
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Figure 2: Price and Vacancy
Figure 3: Transaction and Vacancy
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literature on middlemen in search and matching pioneered by Rubinstein and Wolin-
sky (1987). Previously, it was argued that middlemen could survive by developing
reputations as sellers of high quality goods (Li, 1998), by holding a large inventory
of diﬀerentiated products to make shopping less costly for others (Johri and Leach,
2001; Shevchenko, 2004; Smith, 2004), by raising the matching rate in case match-
ing is subject to increasing returns (Masters, 2007), and by lowering distance-related
trade costs for others (Tse, 2011). This paper studies the role of middlemen in the
provision of market liquidity.
A simple model of housing market flippers as middlemen is also in Bayer et al.
(2011). The model though is partial equilibrium in nature and cannot be used to
answer many of the questions we ask in this paper. Flippers are also present in the
model of the interaction of the frictional housing and labor markets of Head and Lloyd-
Ellis (2011), which is fully general equilibrium in nature. Analyzes of how middlemen
may serve to improve liquidity in a search market also include Gazza (2011) and Lagos
et al. (2011). However, none of these studies allows end-user households a choice of
whether to deal with the middlemen and for the multiplicity of equilibrium and how
the extent of the presence of these middlemen may vary across the equilibria. A recent
paper by Wright and Wong (2011) shows that how, like our model, equilibrium in a
search model with middlemen may exhibit bubble-like characters.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 contains the detailed analysis.
Section 4 takes a more systematic look at the patterns shown in Figures 1-3 with
reference to the model’s implications. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to
the Appendix. For brevity, we restrict attention to analyzing steady-state equilibrium
in this paper. A companion technical note (Leung and Tse, 2011) covers the analysis
of the dynamics.9
2 Model
2.1 Basics
The city is populated by a continuum of measure one risk-neutral households, each of
whom discounts the future at the same rate rH . There are two types of housing in the
city: owner-occupied, the supply of which is perfectly inelastic at H < 1 and rental,
which is supplied perfectly elastically for a fixed rental of q. A household staying in
a matched owner-occupied house derives a flow utility of υ > 0, whereas a household
either in a mismatched house or in rental housing none. A household-house match
breaks up exogenously at a Poisson arrival rate δ, after which the household may
continue to stay in the house but it no longer enjoys the flow utility υ. In the mean
time, the household may choose to sell the old house and search out a new match.
An important assumption is that a household cannot hold more than one house at
9Not for publication, available for download in http://www.sef.hku.hk/~tsechung/index.htm
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a time. Then a mismatched homeowner must first sell the old house before she can
buy a new one. The qualitative nature of our results should hold as long as there is
a limit, not necessarily one, on the number of houses a household can own at a time.
The one-house-limit assumption simplifies considerably.
The search market A seller meets a buyer in a search market at a Poisson arrival
rate η, while a buyer finds a match in the same market at another Poisson arrival
rate μ. The flow of matches in the search market is governed by a CRS matching
function M (B,S), where B and S denote, respectively, the measures of buyers and
sellers in the market. Hence,
μ =M (1, θ) , (1)
η = μθ , (2)
where θ = S/B denotes market tightness,10 and that
∂μ
∂θ > 0,
∂η
∂θ < 0.
Prices in the search market fall out of Nash bargaining.
The Walrasian investment market Instead of waiting out a buyer to arrive in
the search market, a mismatched homeowner may sell her old house right away in a
Walrasian market populated by specialist investors–agents who do not live in the
houses they have bought but rather attempt to profit from buying low and selling
high. Because homogeneous flippers do not gain by selling and buying houses to
and from one another, the risk-neutral flippers may only sell in the end-user search
market and will succeed in doing so at the same rate η that any household-seller does
in the market. We allow for flippers to discount the future at a possibly diﬀerent rate
rF than the households in the city.11 In the competitive investment market, prices
adjust to eliminate any excess returns on real estate investment.
We recognize that the assumption of a Walrasian investment market seemingly
completely contradicts the motivations for applying the search and matching frame-
work to the study of the housing market. We believe that what is needed in the
analysis is not an investment market altogether free of search frictions of any kind,
but one in which the frictions are less severe than in the end-user market. If flippers
are entirely motivated by arbitrage considerations and do not care if the houses to
10This definition of market tightness measures the intensity of competition among sellers. Equiv-
alently, one can define market tightness as B/S to measure the intensity of competition among
buyers. We find the first definition more convenient for this analysis.
11While institutional investors may be able to finance investment at a lower interest rate, banks
in many places charge higher mortgage interest rates for those who are buying a second home and
for those who are not buying a house for occupation. We leave it as an open question as to whether
rF
<
>rH is the more empirically relevant case.
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be purchased are good matches for their own occupation, search should not a par-
ticularly serious problem. In reality, we imagine that households who intend to sell
quickly and are willing to accept a lower price will convey their intentions to real
estate agents, who in turn will alert any specialist investors the availability of such
deals. The competition among flippers should then drive prices up to just enough to
eliminate any excess returns on investment. AWalrasian market assumption captures
the favor of such arrangements in the simplest possible manner.
2.2 Accounting identities and housing market flows
Accounting identities At any one time, a household can either be staying in a
matched house, in a mismatched house, or in rental housing. Let nM , nU , and nR
denote the measures of households in the respective states. The population constraint
reads
nM + nU + nR = 1. (3)
Each owner-occupied house in the city must be held either by a household in the city
or by a flipper. Hence,
nM + nU + nF = H, (4)
where nF denotes both the measures of active flippers and houses held by these
individuals.
If each household can hold no more than one house at any moment, the only
buyers in the search market are households in rental housing; i.e.,
B = nR. (5)
On the other hand, sellers in the search market include mismatched homeowners and
flippers, so that
S = nU + nF . (6)
Housing market flows The flows into matched owner-occupied housing are house-
holds in rental housing who just manage to buy up a house, whereas a fraction δ of
matched households become mismatched in each time unit. In the steady state, with
nM stationary,
μnR = δnM . (7)
Households’ whose matches just break up may choose to sell their houses right away
to flippers in the investment market or to wait out a buyer to arrive in the search
market. Let α denote the fraction of mismatched households who choose to sell in
the investment market and 1 − α the fraction of households who choose to sell in
the search market. Hence, if the measure of mismatched homeowners (nU) is to stay
unchanging through time,
(1− α) δnM = ηnU , (8)
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where ηnU gives the measure of mismatched homeowners who just manage to dispose
of their properties in the search market. Next, those who enter rental housing include
households who just sell their properties to flippers and to end users, respectively. The
exits are comprised of households who just find a match in owner-occupied housing,
so that
αδnM + ηnU = μnR, (9)
for nR to stay stationary. Finally, the measure of houses held by flippers increase by
the measure of houses recently mismatched households decide to dispose right away
in the investment market and decline by the measure of houses flippers manage to
sell to end-users. Hence, in the steady state,12
αδnM = ηnF . (10)
Lemma 1 In the steady state,
α = nF
nU + nF
;
i.e., the fraction of mismatched households who choose to sell in the investment market
(α) is the same as the market share of flippers in the search market–the fraction of
houses for sale in the market by flippers.
2.3 Flippers’ market share, market tightness, and turnovers
Equations (1)-(10) can be used to derive a function for market tightness (θ) of flippers’
market share (α) in the search market.
Lemma 2 From the accounting identities and the housing market flow equations is
an implicit function for θ of α: eθ : [0, 1]→ heθL,eθUi , where
eθ (1−H)
1− eθα −
δH − μ
³eθ´ (1−H)
δ + μ
³eθ´α = 0, (11)
and that ∂eθ/∂α < 0. The lower and upper bounds eθL and eθU , both of which are
strictly positive and finite, are given by, respectively, the solutions of (11) at α = 1
and α = 0. Specifically, eθL < 1.
Given α, once θ is determined by (11), the steady-state measures of the various
types of agents are uniquely determined. The following summarizes the results.
12Where (3) and (4) are two equations in four unknowns, once any two of the four variables are
given, the other two are uniquely determined. In this connection, it is straightforward to verify that
only two of the four steady-state flow equations (7)-(10) constitute independent restrictions.
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Lemma 3
a. At α = 0,
nF = 0, nR = 1−H, nM = H − nU ,
whereas nU is given by the solution to
nU
1−H − μ
−1
µ
δ H − nU
1−H + nU
¶
= 0.
b. As α increases from 0,
∂nF
∂α > 0,
∂nR
∂α > 0,
∂nM
∂α > 0, whereas
∂nU
∂α < 0.
c. At α = 1,
nU = 0, nR = 1−H + nF , nM = H − nF ,
whereas nF is given by the solution to
nF
1−H + nF − μ
−1
µ
δ H − nF
1−H + nF
¶
= 0.
When no houses are sold to flippers (α = 0), trivially nF = 0 in the steady state,
whereas when all mismatched houses are sold to flippers in the first instance, no
households should remain in a mismatched house in the steady state, so that nU = 0.
And then as α increases from 0 towards 1, nF should only increase and nU decline.
Lemma 3 confirms these intuitions. What is less obvious in the Lemma is that both
nR and nM increase along with the increase in α. The first tendency follows from the
fact that if both the city’s population and the housing stock are given, a unit increase
in the measure of houses held by flippers must be matched by a unit decline in the
measure of houses occupied by the households in the city. To follow then is the same
unit increase in the city’s households in rental housing. For the second tendency,
with an increase in α, fewer households spend any time at all selling their old houses
in the search market before initiating search for a new match. In the mean time, the
decrease in θ (Lemma 2), through lowering μ, lengthens the time a household spends
on average in rental housing before a new match can be found. By Lemma 3, the first
eﬀect dominates, so that more households are in matched owner-occupied housing in
the steady state.
Lemma 2 states that an increase in α lowers market tightness, given by
θ = S
B
=
nU + nF
nR
.
11
Indeed, the relation also follows from the comparative statics results in Lemma 3.
First, where ∂nR/∂α > 0, there will be more buyers to follow an increase in α.
Second, given that by (4),
nU + nF = H − nM ,
∂S
∂α =
∂ [nU + nF ]
∂α = −
∂nM
∂α < 0.
That is, when more households are matched, there must only be fewer houses on the
market. The two tendencies–more buyers (nR) and fewer sellers (nU+nF )–reinforce
each other to result in a smaller θ.
In the model housing market, the entire stock of vacant house comprises of houses
held by flippers. With a given housing stock, the vacancy rate is simply equal to
nF/H. A direct corollary of Lemma 3b is that:
Lemma 4 In the steady state, the vacancy rate for owner-occupied houses is increas-
ing in α.
Housing market transactions per time unit in the model are comprised of (i) αδnM
houses sold from households to flippers, (ii) ηnF houses flippers sell to households,
and (iii) ηnU houses sold by one household to another, adding up to an aggregate
transaction volume,
T = αδnM + ηnF + ηnU .
Lemma 5 In the steady state, transaction volume is increasing in α.
The usual measure of turnover in the housing market is the time it takes for a
house to be sold, what is known as Time-On-the-Market (TOM). Given that houses
sold in the investment market are on the market for a vanishingly small time interval
and houses sold in the search market for a length of time equal to 1/η on average, we
may define the model’s average TOM as
αδnM
T
× 0 + ηnF + ηnU
T
× 1η . (12)
Lemma 6 In the steady state, on average, TOM is decreasing in α.
There is a composition eﬀect (more houses sold to flippers for which TOM is equal
to 0) and a “structural” eﬀect (a larger η for houses sold in the search market given
that ∂η/∂θ < 0 and ∂θ/∂α < 0) reinforcing one another. In sum, Lemmas 5 and 6
confirm that when there is a greater market share for flippers, there is also a greater
aggregate transaction volume and houses are sold more quickly on average.
TOM is a measure of the turnover of houses for sale, and as such it does not carry
any direct welfare implications. A more household-centric measure of turnover is the
12
length of time a household (rather than a house) has to stay unmatched. We define
what we call Time-Between-Matches (TBM) as the sum of two spells: (1) the time
it takes for a household to sell the old house, and (2) the time it takes to find a new
match. While the first spell (TOM) on average is shorter with an increase in α, the
second is longer where the decline in θ to accompany the increase in α causes μ to
fall. A priori then it is not clear what happens to the average length of the whole
spell. The old house is sold more quickly. But it also takes longer on average to find a
new match in a market with fewer sellers and more buyers. To examine which eﬀect
dominates, write the model’s average TBM as
α 1μ + (1− α)
µ
1
η +
1
μ
¶
=
1
μ +
1− α
η .
where 1/μ is the average TBM for households who sell in the investment market13
and 1/η + 1/μ for households who sell in the search market.14
Lemma 7 In the steady state, on average, TBM is decreasing in α.
Lemma 7 perhaps may be taken as the dual of Lemma 3a (∂nM/∂α > 0). When
matched households are more numerous in the steady state, on average, people must
be spending less time between matches
Up to this point, the model is purely mechanical. Given α, market tightness
θ is completely isomorphic of the determination of housing prices in equilibrium.
The same conclusion carries over to the determination of vacancy, turnover, and
transaction volume. If not for the inclusion of flippers in the model housing market, α
is identically equal to 0 and Lemma 2 would have completed the analysis of everything
that seems to be of any interest. With the inclusion of flippers and their market share
measured by α, Lemmas 6 and 7 show how changes in the latter aﬀect the turnovers
of houses and households, which can have important consequences on welfare–a
question we shall address in the following. But first α obviously should be made
endogenous to which we next turn.
2.4 Asset values and housing prices
Asset values for flippers Let VF be the value of a vacant house to a flipper and
pFS the price she expects to receive for selling it in the search market. In the steady
state,
rFVF = η (pFS − VF ) , (13)
13The household sells the old house instantaneously. Given a house-finding rate μ, the average
TBM is then 1/μ.
14Let t1 denote the time it takes the household to sell the old house in the search market and
t2 − t1 the time it takes the household to find a new match after the old house is sold. Then the
household’s TBM is just t2. On average, E [t2] =
R∞
0
ηe−ηt1
³R∞
t1
t2μe−μ(t2−t1)dt2
´
dt1 = 1/η+1/μ.
13
where η denotes the matching rate for sellers in the search market. Let pFB be the
price the flipper has paid for the house in the competitive investment market in the
first place. In equilibrium, where any excess returns on real estate investment are
eliminated,
pFB = VF . (14)
Asset values for households There are three (mutually exclusive) states to which
a household can belong:
1. in a matched house; value VM ,
2. in a mismatched house; value VU ,
3. in rental housing; value VR.
The flow payoﬀ for a matched owner-occupier first of all includes the utility she
derives from staying in a matched house υ. The match will be broken, however,
with probability δ, after which the household may sell the house right away in the
investment market at price pFB and switch to rental housing immediately thereafter.
Alternatively, the household can continue to stay in the house while trying to sell it
in the search market. In all then,
rHVM = υ + δ (max {VR + pFB, VU}− VM) . (15)
Let pH denote the price a household-seller expects to receive in the search market.
Then the flow payoﬀ of a mismatched owner-occupier is equal to
rHVU = η (VR + pH − VU) . (16)
Two comments are in order. First, in (16), the mismatched owner-occupier is entirely
preoccupied with disposing the old house while she makes no attempt to search for a
new match. This is due to the assumption that a household cannot hold more than
one house at a time and the search process is memoryless. Second, under (15) and
(16), the household has only one chance to sell the house in the investment market–
at the moment the match is broken. Those who forfeit this one-time opportunity
must wait out a buyer in the search market to arrive. This restriction is without
loss of generality in a steady-state equilibrium, in which the asset values and housing
prices stay unchanging over time. No matter, after the old house is disposed of, the
household moves to rental housing to start searching for a new match. Hence, with
α equal to the fraction of houses oﬀered for sale in the search market held by flippers
and 1− α the fraction held by ordinary households,
rHVR = −q + μ (VM − (αpFS + (1− α) pH)− VR) , (17)
where μ denotes the matching rate for buyers in the search market.
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Bargaining Prices in the search market fall out of Nash bargaining between a
matched buyer-seller pair. There is only one buyer type in the search market–
households in rental housing. The sellers, however, are either flippers or mismatched
homeowners. When a household-buyer is matched with a flipper, the division of
surplus in Nash Bargaining satisfies
VM − pFS − VR = pFS − VF , (18)
whereas when the household-buyer is matched with a household-seller, the division
of surplus in Nash Bargaining satisfies15
VM − pH − VR = VR + pH − VU . (19)
2.5 Which market to sell?
Write
∆ = VR + pFB − VU (20)
as the diﬀerence in payoﬀ for a mismatched homeowner between selling in the in-
vestment market (VR + pFB) and in the search market (VU). By (13), (14), (18), and
(19),
∆ = 2
µη + rF
η pFB − pH
¶
= 2 (pFS − pH) .
That is, mismatched homeowners prefer to sell right away in the investment market if
the given instantaneous reward (pFB) dominates an appropriately-discounted reward
of waiting out in the search market
³ η
η+rF pH
´
. In turn, the condition is equivalent
to whether the price at which flippers sell in the search market (pFS) is greater than
or less than the price household-sellers receive in the same market (pH). Lemma 9 in
the Appendix presents the solutions of pFS and pH , together with the various asset
values from (13)-(19). It is then straightforward to show that pFS − pH has just the
same sign as
S∆ ≡
µ
rH
rF
− 1− z
¶
η + μ− 2 (δ + rH) z, (21)
where z = q/υ.16 If S∆ is thought of as measuring the incentives for mismatched
homeowners to sell in the investment market, such incentives are weakened at larger
rF and q. Intuitively, flippers may only oﬀer a lower price when they face a higher
15With multiple types, the assumption of perfect information in bargaining is perhaps stretching
a bit. We could have specified a bargaining game with imperfect information as in Harsanyi and
Selten (1972), Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), or Riddell (1981), for instance. It is not clear what
may be the payoﬀs for the added complications.
16Lemma 9 in the Appendix presents two sets of prices and asset values, one derived under the
assumption that ∆ ≤ 0 and the other ∆ > 0. In either case, pFS − pH is seen to have the same sign
as S∆ in (21).
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cost of financing and it becomes less attractive for mismatched homeowners to switch
to rental housing sooner by quickly selling in the investment market if rental housing
is more costly. On the other hand, the incentives are strengthened at a larger υ. One
interpretation is that it becomes more attractive to shorten Time-Between-Matches
by quickly selling in the investment market if there is a higher reward for staying in
a matched owner-occupied house. Most of all, however, S∆ can be thought of as a
function of θ. In this case, we can define a correspondence bα : R+ ⇒ [0, 1], whereby
bα (θ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0
[0, 1]
1
S∆ (θ) < 0
S∆ (θ) = 0
S∆ (θ) > 0
(22)
that gives the fraction of mismatched homeowners who choose to sell in the investment
market.
2.6 Equilibrium
We now have two steady-state relations between α and θ: the eθ (α) function in (11)
and the bα (θ) correspondence in (22). A steady-state equilibrium is any {α, θ} pair
that simultaneously satisfies the two relations.
3 Analysis
3.1 Existence of equilibrium
To show the existence of equilibrium, it is useful to define F (α) ≡ bα³eθ (α)´, a
correspondence mapping [0, 1] into itself. Equilibrium then is any fixed point of F .
Proposition 1 Equilibrium exists for all positive {rH , rF , υ, q, δ, H} tuple.
3.2 Multiplicity
To check for uniqueness and multiplicity, we begin with inverting the eθ (α) function
in (11) to define eα ≡ eθ−1, whereby eα : heθL,eθUi → [0, 1]. Given that ∂eθ/∂α < 0,
likewise, ∂eα/∂θ < 0. That is, eα (θ) decreases continuously from 1 at θ = eθL to 0
at θ = eθU . Figure 4 depicts an example of the eα (θ) schedule. Now, for the bα (θ)
correspondence:
Lemma 8 As a function of θ,
a. if rF < brF , where brF ≡ rH
1 + z
, (23)
16
Figure 4: The eα function
and assuming that
−θ∂
2μ
∂θ2 μ+ 2
∂μ
∂θ
µ
θ∂μ∂θ − μ
¶
< 0, 17
then S∆ is U-shaped, and that limθ→0S∆ = limθ→∞S∆ =∞.
b. if rF ≥ brF , then ∂S∆/∂θ > 0 throughout, and that limθ→0S∆ < 0 but limθ→∞S∆ > 0.
By Lemma 8a, where rF < brF , S∆ can stay positive throughout (the upper curve
in the left panel of Figure 5). In this case then, bα (θ) = 1 for all θ ≥ 0, as depicted in
Panel A of Figure 6. Alternatively, there can also be two roots to S∆ = 0 (the lower
curve in the left panel of Figure 5), say bθ1 and bθ2, where bθ1 < bθ2. In this case,
bα (θ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 θ ∈
³bθ1,bθ2´
[0, 1] θ = bθ1 and bθ2
1 θ ∈
h
0,bθ1´ ∪ ³bθ2,∞´ .
See Panels C and D of Figure 6 for two examples of such bα (θ). By Lemma 8b, where
rF ≥ brF , there is a unique root to S∆ = 0, say bθ, as shown in the right panel of 5.
17The condition is guaranteed to hold if μ is isoelastic.
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Figure 5: S∆ as a function of θ
The bα (θ) correspondence that follows is thus given by
bα (θ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0
[0, 1]
1
θ < bθ
θ = bθ
θ > bθ .
See Panels E and F of Figure 6 for two examples of such bα (θ).
To summarize, for large θ = S/B, bα (θ) = 1 must hold, whether or not rF ≤>brF–
whereas it can take a long time to sell in a tight search market in which sellers
outnumber buyers by a significant margin, mismatched homeowners are better oﬀ
to just sell in the investment market at a discount. On the other hand, where the
bargaining power sellers acquire under a small θ should allow them to sell at a high
price, they can similarly prefer to just sell right away in the investment market to
capitalize on the high housing price sooner. This eﬀect is strongest for smaller rF
(rF < brF ) under which flippers can aﬀord to pay higher prices. For intermediate θ,
neither of the two incentives to sell in the investment market is strong enough to
cause S∆ ≥ 0, so that mismatched homeowners would prefer to wait it out in the
search market.
Given the eα (θ) schedule in Figure 4 and the bα (θ) graphs in Figure 6, equilibrium
is any θ at which eα (θ) ⊂ bα (θ). Now, if 1 ⊂ bα³eθL´, then θ = eθL and α = 1 is a
steady-state equilibrium since by construction, eα³eθL´ = 1. In this equilibrium, all
transactions are intermediated and turnover is fastest. On the other hand, if 0 ⊂bα³eθU´, then θ = eθU and α = 0 is a steady-state equilibrium since by construction,eα³eθU´ = 0. In this equilibrium, all sales and purchases are between two end-users
while turnover is slowest. In between, there can be equilibrium in which θ = bθ,
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Figure 6: The bα (θ) correspondence
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Figure 7: Multiple equilibrium — bθ2 ≤ eθU
bθ1, or bθ2 and α = eα (θ) if the given θ ∈ ³eθL,eθU´. In such an equilibrium, with
mismatched homeowners indiﬀerent between selling in the investment and search
markets, a fraction, but only a fraction, of all transactions are intermediated.
Proposition 2 For arbitrarily small rF , the unique equilibrium is θ = eθL; for
rF ≥ brF , there is a unique equilibrium at either θ = eθL, bθ, or eθU . For rF < brF and
where there are two θ that solves S∆ = 0 (Panels C and D of Figure 6), there exist
at least two equilibria at θ = eθL and θ = bθ2 or eθU if and only if bθ1 ∈ heθL,eθUi. A
third equilibrium at a distinct bθ1 exists if bθ1 > eθL.
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the situations covered by the second part of the Propo-
sition. In both figures, there are three equilibria where bθ1 > eθL. Intuitively, for small
θ = S/B, under which houses are sold at relatively high prices, households find it
advantageous to sell their old houses quickly in the investment market. And then if
all mismatched houses are sold in the investment market in the first instance, there
will be rapid turnover and few houses are for sale in the search market to cause a
small θ. In this way, θ = eθL and α = 1 is equilibrium in Figures 7 and 8. With larger
θ, households’ incentives to sell in the investment market are weakened. Meanwhile,
if fewer or none at all mismatched houses are sold in the investment market, turnover
slows down and more houses are for sale in the search market to cause an increase in
θ. As a result, a smaller α and a larger θ is also equilibrium in Figures 7 and 8.
With the existence of multiple steady-state equilibrium, the presence of flippers’
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Figure 8: Multiple equilibrium — bθ2 > eθU
in the market can be fickle, especially when the equilibrium the market happens to
be in is unstable, a subject we should turn to shortly. In any case, where there are
multiple equilibrium, any seemingly unimportant shock can completely dislocate the
market from one equilibrium and move it to another, causing catastrophic declines in
flippers’ market share, turnover, and transaction volume. To accompany such discrete
declines in the activities of flippers can be discrete declines in housing price, a subject
we should follow up in Section 3.5. In sum, the model housing market can be prone
to apparent boom-bust cycles, just its real-world counterpart often does.
3.3 Dynamics and stability
In Leung and Tse (2011), we show that, of the five types of steady-state equilibrium:
(1) θ = eθL, (2) θ = eθU , (3) θ = bθ1, (4) θ = bθ2, and (5) θ = bθ, all except the bθ1
equilibrium are guaranteed to be locally stable, whereas the bθ1 equilibrium is almost
always unstable.18 Intuitively, the bθ1 equilibrium is unstable because it lies at where
the bα (θ) correspondence is “decreasing”. Consider for instance, a small positive
perturbation from the bθ1 equilibrium in Figure 7. Then, ∆ should turn negative, after
which no mismatched homeowners should still sell in the investment market. When
turnover slows down as a result, market tightness rises. To follow is a further increase
18We cannot completely rule out local stability for the bθ1 equilibrium but find the conditions for
it to be the case highly improbable.
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in θ. Eventually, the market should just settle on the bθ2 steady-state equilibrium in
the Figure. Likewise, a negative perturbation from the the bθ1 equilibrium should send
the market to the eθL steady-state equilibrium.19
We also show in Leung and Tse (2011) that local stability notwithstanding, con-
vergence to the eθU , bθ2, and bθ steady-state equilibria is almost always oscillatory, with
θ under- and overshooting the given steady state and ·θ and ∆ changing signs in the
transition dynamics.
Right at the eθU steady state, recall that nF = 0 where α = 0. Oﬀ steady state,
nF need not be equal to zero despite α = 0 as it may take time for the flippers to
dispose of any inventories they may have previously acquired. The oscillation in the
convergence to the eθU steady state is due to how this running down of the inventory
aﬀects the dynamics of the other state variables. The eθU steady state is a low-level
steady state, with the largest θ = S/B and smallest nM . In the approach to this
steady state then, θ must eventually increase and nM decline. But if there was a
large nF to begin with, its gradual disposal may temporarily help lower θ and raise
nM .
In a bθ2 steady-state equilibrium, ∆ = 0 and mismatched homeowners are indif-
ferent between selling in the two markets. It turns out that almost any dynamic
equilibrium in which ∆ = 0 holds oﬀ steady state can only be divergent. In the
approach to a locally stable bθ2 steady state then, either ∆ < 0 or ∆ > 0. Now, let’s
say suppose to begin with, ∆ < 0. Where α = 0, θ should generally increase towards
the eθU steady state, with ·nF < 0 in the transition. Sooner or later, as θ is moving
away from bθ2 and nearing eθU , in Figure 7, ∆ must turn positive. At the moment
this happens, all mismatched homeowners will find it optimal to just sell in the in-
vestment market. The convergence now is to the eθL steady state, with nU remaining
equal to zero throughout. This means that when θ hits bθ2 in the first instance, it will
not come to rest as bθ2 is steady state only for nU equal to some particular positive
value. Eventually, when θ is suﬃciently far away from bθ2 in its approach to eθL, in
Figure 7, ∆ must turn negative again. Given that, like a bθ2 steady-state equilibrium,
a bθ steady-state equilibrium is also at where bα (θ) is “increasing”, the same analysis
applies. The analysis in Leung and Tse (2011) implies that this kind of oscillation
should dampen over time to come to rest at the given steady state.
The oscillation and limited cycles in the dynamics are, not surprisingly, entirely
due to the presence of flippers. If both α and nF are forced to zero a priori, the only
equilibrium is a eθU equilibrium, the convergence of which must be direct if nF = 0.
19Granted that the S∆ and eθ functions are merely steady-state relations, the arguments above no
doubt involve a good dose of hand waving. The full-fetched dynamic analysis is in Leung and Tse
(2011).
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3.4 Cost of financing and flippers’ market share
By Proposition 2, α = 1 for small rF and then at larger rF , α can fall below unity.
This is intuitive. Flippers can aﬀord to pay the highest price when they can finance
investment at the least cost. As rF increases, their dominance can only fall. More
precisely, by Lemma 10 in the Appendix:
(A) For the smallest rF , S∆ > 0 for all θ, so that the bα (θ) = 1 throughout as
shown in Panel A of Figure 6.
(B) As rF increases to some given level below brF , the S∆ curve in the left panel in
Figure 5 would just be tangent to the horizontal axis at which bα (θ) = [0, 1], whereasbα (θ) remains equal to unity at all other θ; the bα (θ) correspondence turns into the
one in Panel B of Figure 6.
(C) Thereafter, the minimum of the S∆ curve in the left panel in Figure 5 dips
below zero. With two roots to S∆ = 0, the bα (θ) correspondence becomes like the one
in Panel C of Figure 6.
(D) While rF remains below brF , ∂bθ1/∂rF < 0 and ∂bθ2/∂rF > 0. Panel C turns
into D.
(E) In the limit as rF → brF , bθ1 = 0 and bθ2 = bθL–the unique root of S∆ = 0 at
which rF = brF just holds. Panel D turns into E
(F) Given that rF ≥ brF , ∂bθ/∂rF > 0, while the limiting value of bθ as rF becomes
arbitrarily large, bθU , is finite. Panel E gradually evolves towards F.
Granted that eα (θ) is independent of rF , the eﬀects of an increase in rF on equilib-
rium {α, θ} can then be read oﬀ by superimposing the same given eα (θ) successively
into Panels A to F of Figure 6. We can conclude from this exercise the following.
Proposition 3
a. For small rF , equilibrium is θ = eθL and α = 1.
b. For large rF , α must fall below unity in equilibrium.
i. If bθU ≥ eθU , as rF becomes large, θ = eθU and α = 0.
ii. Otherwise, α stays positive for arbitrarily large rF .
c. If θ = eθL and α = 1 is not equilibrium at rF , the pair is not equilibrium at
r0F > rF . If θ = eθU and α = 0 is equilibrium at rF , the pair is equilibrium at
r0F > rF .
d. Any bθ2 or bθ equilibrium is increasing in rF , and therefore the accompanying α
is decreasing in rF .
e. Any bθ1 equilibrium is decreasing in rF , and therefore the accompanying α is
increasing in rF .
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Parts (a)-(d) of the Proposition conform to the intuitive notion that an increase
(decrease) in rF should have a negative (positive) impact on flippers’s market share.
Still, it is surprising that α can remain strictly positive even for arbitrarily large
rF , for which flippers can only finance investment at a huge disadvantage vis-a-vis
ordinary households. The condition for this to be the case, bθU < eθU , holds for largeeθU . By (51) in the proof of Lemma 2, ∂eθU/∂H > 0, and that limH→1 eθU = ∞. In
general, we can show that ∂eθ/∂H > 0 for each α ∈ [0, 1]. With a larger housing
stock, there can only be more units for sale, other things being equal. In the mean
time, where there are fewer households in rental housing, there can only be fewer
buyers in the search market. For a large enough eθU , a role for flippers can remain no
matter what, if mismatched homeowners find it too diﬃcult to sell in the end-user
search market.
Part (e) is rather counterintuitive too for it says that an increase (decrease) in
rF can have a positive (negative) impact on flippers’ market share in equilibrium.
In Figures 7 and 8, bθ1 is the endpoint of an interval of θ over which mismatched
homeowners strictly prefer to sell in the investment market to quickly capitalize on
the high housing price due to a small θ. Now, flippers would be able to pay even
higher prices at a smaller rF and this should only cause the interval
h
0,bθ1i to expand.
If equilibrium is at bθ1, the increase in bθ1 is a movement down eα (θ), giving rise to a
smaller α.
On the contrary, by Part (d), an increase (decrease) in rF will have the expected
negative (positive) impact on flippers’ market share in a bθ2 or bθ equilibrium. In
Figures 7, bθ2 is the smallest θ within the interval hbθ2,∞´, over which mismatched
homeowners find it advantageous to sell in the investment market because it takes
too long to sell in the search market. A decline in rF , by raising the price flippers
are able to oﬀer to mismatched homeowners, enlarges the interval. Where the decline
in bθ2 is a movement up the downward-sloping eα (θ), in equilibrium α increases. A
similar analysis applies to a bθ equilibrium.
On the whole, one can conclude that at a smaller rF , flippers are more numerous
and more transactions are intermediated if one is willing to dismiss any bθ1 equilibrium
on stability grounds and the possibility that agents may coordinate to a smaller α
equilibrium in case there exist multiple equilibrium. However, we do not think that
the analysis, strictly speaking, allows us to reach any such unambiguous conclusions.
And we cannot rule out occasions, admittedly rare, in which a decline in rF can,
rather perversely, be followed by a decline in the presence of flippers in the model
housing market.
3.5 Housing prices
Housing prices in no-intermediation equilibrium Absent flippers, all hous-
ing market transactions are between end-user households at price pH , given by (34)
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evaluated at α = 0,20
pH =
(η + rH − μ) υ + (2δ + η + 2rH) q
(2δ + η + 2rH) rH . (24)
In Leung and Tse (2011), we find that, nearing the given steady state whereby nF ' 0,
housing price and transaction volume move in opposite directions in the transition
dynamics. Vacancy either stays equal to zero (when nF = 0 in the transition) or
declines monotonically (when nF > 0 in the transition).
Housing prices in fully-intermediated equilibrium In a fully-intermediated
equilibrium, all houses are first sold from mismatched homeowners to flippers at pFB,
given by (42), in the investment market and then at pFS, given by (41), from flippers
to end-user households in the search market, where pFB < pFS. Now, houses sold
from households to flippers stay on the market for a vanishingly small time interval,
whereas houses sold from flippers to households in the search market stay on the
market for, on average, 1/η > 0 units of time. There should then be a positive
cross-section relation between price and TOM in the model housing market, as in the
real-world housing market. Besides, with pFB < pFS, the model trivially predicts that
houses bought by flippers are at lower prices than are houses bought by non-flippers.
Depken et al. (2009) find the tendency to hold in their hedonic price regressions. In
Leung and Tse (2011), we find that around the eθL steady state, price and vacancy
move in opposite directions, whereas there exists no definite relationship between the
two variables and transaction volume in the transition dynamics.
Housing prices in partially-intermediated equilibrium In a steady-state equi-
librium in which mismatched homeowners sell in both the investment and search mar-
kets, in addition to the two prices pFB and pFS for transactions between a flipper and
an end-user household, there will also be transactions between two end-user house-
holds, carried out at price pH . In any partially-intermediated equilibrium, pH = pFS,
however, so that all transactions in the search market are at the same price after all.
In this case, pH = pFS is given by either (34) or (35) evaluated at S∆ = 0,
pH = pIS =
(η + rI) υ
rF (2δ + η + 2rH) , (25)
whereas in the investment market, pFB is given by (36), similarly evaluated at S∆ = 0,
pIB =
ηυ
rF (2δ + η + 2rH) . (26)
Just as in the fully-intermediated equilibrium, here there exists a positive relation
between TOM and price in the cross section and houses bought by flippers are at
lower prices.
20The equations for the housing prices and asset values referred to hereinafter can be found in
Lemma 9 in the Appendix.
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Prices across equilibria Recall that across steady-state equilibria, θ = S/B is
smallest in the equilibrium where flippers are most numerous. A priori, one would
expect that prices are also highest in such an equilibrium where there is least com-
petition among sellers.
Proposition 4 If θ = eθL, bθ1, and bθ2 are all steady-state equilibria, prices in the
search and investment markets are highest in the eθL equilibrium and lowest in thebθ2 equilibrium. If θ = eθL, bθ1, and eθU are all steady-state equilibria, prices in the
search and investment markets are highest in the eθL equilibrium and lowest in the eθU
equilibrium if μ is isoelastic and that (δ+rH)2
2δ+rH ≤ 34 .
We should emphasis that the condition in the latter part of the Proposition is
merely a suﬃcient condition. Indeed, we fail to find a single instance in which the
conclusion fails across a large number of numerical experiments notwithstanding the
condition holding in reverse. In any case, the condition is easily met for conventional
values for δ and rH .21 Now, a direct corollary of the Proposition and Lemmas 4-7 is
that:
Proposition 5 Across steady-state equilibria in case multiple equilibrium exist, price,
vacancy, and transaction volume increase or decrease together from one to another
equilibrium, whereas average TOM and TBM move with the former set of variables
in the opposite direction.
Interest rate shocks As usual, in the present model, interest rates can play an
important role in determining housing prices. But first, in the entire absence of
flippers, housing price pH in a no-intermediation equilibrium only depend on rH but
not on the rate rF at which flippers may be able to finance investment. Specifically,
a decline in rH will lead to higher prices, as can be verified by diﬀerentiating (24),
but market tightness, vacancy, turnover, and transaction volume will just stay at the
given levels entirely determined by the housing stock, the rate matched households
becomes mismatched, and the matching technology in the search market, as described
in Lemmas 2-7 with α = 0.
On the other hand, in a fully-intermediated equilibrium, prices in both the invest-
ment and search market, given by pFB and pFS, respectively, are decreasing in rF ,
as can be verified by diﬀerentiating (42) and (41). Just as in the no-intermedation
equilibrium, such interest rate shocks will leave no impact on market tightness, trans-
action volume, turnover, and vacancy, if all transactions were already intermediated
in the first place.
In a partially-intermediated equilibrium where S∆ = 0, prices in the search market
pFS (= pH), as well as in the investment market, pFB, are decreasing in rF , just as
they are in a fully-intermediated equilibrium. But where θ was not already fixed at
21If rH = 0, the condition is satisfied for δ ≤ 3/2. If δ = 0, the condition is satisifed for rH ≤ 3/4.
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the boundary of eθU , housing prices can also change to follow any movements in θ
triggered by the given interest rate shock. Diﬀerentiating (25) and (26) with respect
to θ confirms that prices in both markets are decreasing in θ, so that prices are
higher when the competition among sellers is less intense. Hence, if a given positive
(negative) interest rate shock should cause θ to increase (decrease), there will be lower
(higher) housing prices to follow because of its direct negative (positive) impact and
of an indirect eﬀect through lowering (raising) flippers’ market share and then raising
(lowering) market tightness. However, a positive interest rate shock need not cause
θ to increase and α to fall. By Proposition 3e, along any bθ1 equilibrium, the given
interest rate shock will be followed by a decline in θ and an increase in α. Furthermore,
in case there exist multiple equilibrium, θ can fall and α can increase just by itself
when the housing market, for whatever reason, moves to a high α equilibrium from an
initial low α equilibrium, without any change in parameter values. In what direction
housing prices will move then cannot be unambiguously read oﬀ from (25) and (26) as
the direct eﬀect of any interest rate shock and the indirect eﬀect through the changes
in θ can aﬀect housing prices diﬀerently. To proceed, we solve S∆ = 0 for rF and
substitute the result into (25) and (26), respectively,
pFS = pH =
(η + rH − μ) υ + (2δ + η + 2rH) q
rH (2δ + η + 2rH) , (27)
pFB =
(η − μ) υ + (2δ + η + 2rH) q
rH (2δ + η + 2rH) . (28)
The two equations are independent of rF ; whatever eﬀects a given change in rF will
have on housing prices are subsumed through the eﬀects of changes in θ that follow
the change in rF obtained from holding S∆ = 0. To evaluate the the eﬀects of rF on
housing prices then is to diﬀerentiate these two expressions just with respect to θ.
Proposition 6 Across steady-state equilibria and holding S∆ = 0, a shock to rF ,
whether positive or negative, will cause housing price to increase (decrease), as long
as to follow the interest rate shock is a decrease (increase) in θ and an increase
(decrease) in α.
By Proposition 6 then, the indirect eﬀect of an interest rate shock on housing
prices through the changes in flippers’ presence and then in market tightness always
dominates the direct eﬀect shall the two be of opposite tendencies. A surprising
implication then is that a given increase in flippers’ cost of financing can actually
lead to an increase in housing prices, if to follow the higher interest rate is also a
heightened presence of flippers’ in the market. In any case, a direct corollary of
Lemmas 4-7 and Proposition 6 is that:
Proposition 7 Across steady-state equilibria and holding S∆ = 0, a shock to rF will
cause housing price, transaction volume, and vacancy to move in the same direction,
whereas average TOM and TBM will move in the opposite direction.
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3.6 A general interest rate shock
So far, we have restricted attention to analyzing the eﬀects of an increase in rF alone
on flippers’ presence and housing prices. Many of the implications, however, survive
for a general change in interest rate that aﬀects both flippers and ordinary households
alike. Specifically, write R for rH/rF in (21),
S∆ = (R− 1− z) η + μ− 2 (δ + rH) z. (29)
Then equiproportionate increases in rH and rF , while leaving R unchanged, lower S∆.
A general increase in interest rate thus weakens mismatched homeowners’ incentives
to sell in the investment market, just as an increase in rF , holding fixed rH , does.
Analogous to Proposition 3 is that:
Proposition 8 Holding constant R at some given level,
a. for suﬃciently large rH, in equilibrium, θ > eθL and α < 1. Eventually, as rH
rises above a certain level, θ = eθU and α = 0 must obtain.
b. if θ = eθL and α = 1 is not equilibrium at rH, the pair is not equilibrium at
r0H > rH. If θ = eθU and α = 0 is equilibrium at rH, the pair is equilibrium at
r0H > rH.
c. any bθ2 or bθ equilibrium is increasing in rH, and therefore the accompanying α
is decreasing in rH.
d. any bθ1 equilibrium is decreasing in rH, and therefore the accompanying α is
increasing in rH.
Intuitively, at a higher cost of financing in general, housing prices fall, and the
reward to quickly selling in the investment market diminishes. But just as in the case
of an increase in rF alone, it is not possible to conclude unambiguously that there
must be fewer flippers around, where there exist multiple equilibrium, and that anybθ1 equilibrium is actually decreasing in rH .
The eﬀects of the general increase in the cost of financing on housing prices are
similar to those of an increase in rF by itself. The following proposition summarizes
the results.
Proposition 9
a. In both the no-intermediation and fully-intermediated equilibria, equiproportion-
ate increases in rH and rF lower housing prices.
b. In a partially-intermediated equilibrium,
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i. equiproportionate increases in rH and rF , holding θ fixed, lower housing
prices;
ii. across steady-state equilibria and holding S∆ = 0, equiproportionate changes
in rH and rF , whether positive or otherwise, cause pFB to increase (de-
crease) as long as to follow the interest rate shocks is a decline (increase)
in θ and an increase (decrease) in α and for R ∈ [0, 1 + z]; the same eﬀect
is felt on pFS = pH for R in neighborhoods of R = 0, 1, and 1 + z.
Notice that by (b.i), if to follow the equiproportionate increases in rH and rF is
a decline in flippers’ presence, housing prices must unambiguously decline, just as
when an increase in rF alone causes θ to rise and α to fall will lower housing prices
for sure. More generally, (b.ii) is concerned with how prices may change when the
interest rate shocks may be followed by either an increase or a decline in θ, as in the
situations covered in Proposition 6. Also as in Proposition 6, here prices will increase
if θ happens to fall and α rise to follow the interest rate shocks, positive or otherwise,
if the values of R are appropriately chosen. The last restrictions are suﬃcient, but not
necessary, conditions, and that the conclusions should hold under weaker conditions.
3.7 Welfare
In a steady-state equilibrium where S∆ = 0, asset values for matched and mismatched
homeowners, renters, and flippers are given by respectively,22
VM =
(η + 2rH) υ
rH (2δ + η + 2rH) , (30)
VU =
ηυ
rH (2δ + 2rH + η) , (31)
VR =
(rF − rH) ηυ
rF rH (2δ + η + 2rH) , (32)
VF =
ηυ
rF (2δ + η + 2rH) . (33)
It is straightforward to verify that VM , VU , and VF are all decreasing in θ. Any
homeowners–matched or mismatched, end-users or flippers–benefit from the higher
housing prices in a less tight market. The asset value for households in rental housing
VR, however, is decreasing in θ if rF < rH , which is a necessary condition for multiple
equilibrium to exist (Lemma 8a). In this case, would-be buyers are worse oﬀ with
the higher housing prices in the less tight market. Now, suppose both bθ1 and bθ2 are
22The first two equations are from (37) and (38), respectively. The last two are from (39) and
(36), respectively, both evaluated at S∆ = 0.
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steady-state equilibria with the two θ lying within the interval
heθL,eθUi. In this case,
homeowners are better oﬀ in the bθ1 equilibrium than in the bθ2 equilibrium, whereas
renters are better oﬀ in the second than in the first equilibria. The two steady-state
equilibria then cannot be Pareto-ranked. The same holds for comparison between theeθL and bθ1 equilibria and between the bθ1 and the eθU equilibria.
Even though the equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked, perhaps they can be ranked
by aggregate welfare as measured by the sum of the asset values for all agents,
W = nMVM + nUVU + nRVR + nFVF .
At where S∆ = 0, the asset values are given by (30)-(33). Again, consider a compar-
ison between the bθ1 and bθ2 steady-state equilibria. Substituting from (54) to (57) in
the Appendix for the various steady-state measures of agents and simplifying,
W =
ηυ
2δ + η + 2rH
µ
2H
η + δ +
H − 1
rF
+
1
rH
¶
.
This expression is guaranteed to be decreasing in θ for large H. In this case, there is
a larger aggregate asset value in the less-tight and higher-priced bθ1 equilibrium where
more transactions are intermediated. For smaller H, however, W above is increasing
in θ, so that there is only a smallerW in the bθ1 equilibrium than in the bθ2 equilibrium.
Thus, it seems that the equilibria cannot in general be ranked by even aggregate
asset value. While all agents, except for households in rental housing, benefit from
the higher housing prices in the more active bθ1 equilibrium and that more households
are matched in the steady state amid a shorter average Time-Between-Matches, W
needs not be higher. Would-be buyers in rental housing are more numerous and they
suﬀer a lower asset value with the higher prices. Such a negative impact on W can
more than oﬀset the positive eﬀects of a more active market, especially when there
is a small housing stock. Intuitively, given a small H, there can only be few house
owners to benefit from the higher prices and faster turnover, while there are many
would-be buyers to suﬀer from the same higher prices and the longer wait for owner-
occupied housing. Apparently, when owner-occupied houses are scarce to begin with,
leaving more houses vacant in the hands of flippers can be disproportionately costly.23
Conversely, in a market endowed with a large H, it is hardest to sell and flippers’
role in speeding up turnover is most valued.
23Masters (2007) is also a model in which intermediation in a search and matching environment
can be wasteful.
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4 Time-series relations among housing price, trans-
action volume, and vacancy
By Propositions 5, 7, and 9, the model predicts housing price, transaction volume, and
vacancy should move together over time from one to another steady-state equilibria.24
The positive time-series relation between housing price and transaction volume is
well-known and numerous models have been constructed to account for it. Unique
to our analysis is that vacancy should also move in the same direction with the two
variables.
The prediction is not obviously inconsistent with the pictures depicted in Figures
1-3 in the Introduction. In a more systematic analysis, we first verify that in the
1991-I to 2010-IV sample period, the three variables are all I(1) at conventional
significance levels. Next, we find that the variables are indeed cointegrated by the
Johansen Cointegration Test under all the usual trend assumptions. In particular,
assuming a quadratic deterministic trend, the Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating
equations:
Price —13034×Transaction = 0,
Transaction — 3.87×Vacancy = 0,
which together imply that there exist long-run positive relations among the three
variables. With other trend assumptions, the Trace tests only indicate 1 cointegrating
equation. In a single cointegrating equation with non-zero coeﬃcients for all three
variables, the three cannot move together in the same direction. But if one imposes
a priori two cointegrating equations in the estimation, the same qualitative results
survive.
5 Concluding remarks
By allowing for the presence of flippers, without any assumed or acquired hetero-
geneity and endogenous search eﬀorts, our model predicts a positive relation between
housing price and TOM in the cross section, a relation found in numerous empir-
ical studies. Our model can also generate the well-known relation between price
and transaction volume in the time series. Previous models rely on preference and
construction shocks and increasing returns in the matching technology to generate
such relations. In our model, such relations are the relations among the diﬀerent
steady-state equilibria, as well as from interest rate shocks. Unique to our analysis is
24More precisely, Propositions 7 and 9 are only concerned with partially-intermediated steady-
state equilibria. In both the no-intermediation and fully-intermediated equilibria, housing price
is uncorrelated with transaction and vacancy. The fully-intermediated equilibrium is perhaps less
empirically relevant. In this case, strictly speaking, our analysis predicts that interest rate shocks
should only cause price, transaction, and vacancy to move together when the three variables are at
modest to high levels. This observation is due to our discussant Enrique Schroth.
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that vacancy should move together with price and transaction volume. This relation
appears to be borne out in the data.
If the existence of multiple equilibrium is a natural outcome of the investment
motive in a frictional housing market, the extent of flippers’ presence in the housing
market can be fickle, and then prices can change discretely in response to a discrete
change in the former. The model housing market can then exhibit bubble-like char-
acteristics with prices fluctuating widely without any apparent changes in “market
fundamentals”. Undoubtedly, our analysis cannot be the complete analysis of “specu-
lative bubbles” in the housing market. Credit market conditions, market psychology,
and the dynamics of price movements must also feature prominently. Nevertheless,
we show that even in the absence of such factors, the interaction of the strength of
the incentives to sell quickly to flippers and the influence of these agents’ activities
on market tightness suﬃces to imply an intrinsically volatile housing market.
Throughout the analysis, we assume a constant population and a given housing
stock. A useful extension would be to incorporate a secular growing population and
endogenous housing supply. With a varying population, one on the right side of the
population constraint in (3) would be replaced by the population at the given point
in time, equal to say n. In this case, one can show that the generalization to eθ (α) in
(11) is such that ∂eθ (α) /∂n < 0, whereas ∂eθ (α) /∂H > 0, as previously remarked in
the discussions following Proposition 3. That is, as owner-occupied housing becomes
relatively abundant (scarce), there will be more (fewer) houses for sale for each buyer.
Now, suppose the market is at a eθL equilibrium but where the prevailing housing price
justifies further development. As H increases relative to n, in Figure 7, for example,
the eα (θ) schedule will gradually shift to the right. To follow the increase in market
tightness is a gradual decrease in housing prices. If at some point in time, eθL rises
above bθ1, θ = eθL and α = 1 can no longer be steady-state equilibrium. Then, even
without further housing development, prices will continue to fall when the market
converges to a bθ2 or eθU from an initial eθL equilibrium. Meanwhile, the low prices at
the bθ2 or eθU equilibrium should choke oﬀ any housing development for a while until
the population growth has caught up with the increase in the housing stock to send
the eα (θ) schedule back to where it began. What we usually describe as a cycle of
market crash and recovery may then be the endogenous outcome in this analysis. No
doubt, this conjecture is a widely speculative conjecture but it is also an intriguing
one, which warrants a full-fetched analysis.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Lemma
Lemma 9 For ∆ ≤ 0, so that max {VR + pFB, VU} = VU ,
pH =
((η + rH) (η + 2rF )− ((1− α) (η + rF ) + rF )μ) υ + (2δ + η + 2rH) (η + 2rF ) q
(2δ + η + 2rH) (αμrF + ηrH + 2rF rH) ,
(34)
pFS =
(η + rF ) ((η + 2rH − (1− α)μ) υ + (2δ + η + 2rH) q)
(2δ + η + 2rH) (αμrF + ηrH + 2rIrH) , (35)
pFB = VF =
η ((η + 2rH − (1− α)μ) υ + (2δ + η + 2rH) q)
(2δ + η + 2rH) (αμrF + ηrH + 2rIrH) , (36)
VM =
(η + 2rH) υ
rH (2δ + η + 2rH) , (37)
VU =
ηυ
rH (2δ + 2rH + η) , (38)
VR =
((η + 2rH) rF + (1− α) η (rH − rF ))μυ − rH (η + 2rF ) (2δ + η + 2rH) q
rH (2δ + η + 2rH) (rH (η + 2rF ) + αμrF ) . (39)
For ∆ > 0, so that max {VR + pFB, VU} = VR + pFB and α = 1,
pH =
(ηrH − μrI + 2ηrI + 2rHrF + η2) υ + (2ηrH + 2δrI + 2ηrI + 4rHrF + η2) q
(η + 2rH) (ηrH + μrF + 2δrF + 2rHrF ) ,
(40)
pFS =
(rF + η) (υ + q)
rH (η + 2rF ) + rF (μ+ 2δ) , (41)
pFB = VF =
η (υ + q)
rH (η + 2rF ) + rF (μ+ 2δ) , (42)
VM =
(rH (η + 2rF ) + μrF ) υ − 2δrF q
rH (rH (η + 2rF ) + rF (μ+ 2δ)) , (43)
VU =
η
η + 2rH
(rH (η + 2rF ) + μrI) υ − 2δrIq
rH (rH (η + 2rF ) + rF (μ+ 2δ)) , (44)
VR =
μrFυ − (rH (η + 2rF ) + 2δrF ) q
rH (rH (η + 2rF ) + rF (μ+ 2δ)) . (45)
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Lemma 10
a. For rF < brF , S∆ is U-shaped, with a well-defined minimum. Write S∗∆ =
minθ S∆.
i. For small rF , S∗∆ > 0.
ii. ∂S∗∆/∂rF < 0. As rF increases, before rF reaches brF , S∗∆ = 0 at some
θ = bθ∗.
iii. Thereafter, as rF continues to increase, S∗∆ falls below 0, and that the two
roots of S∆ = 0, bθ1 and bθ2 diverge as ∂bθ1/∂rF < 0 but ∂bθ2/∂rF > 0.
iv. As rF → brF , bθ1 → 0 and bθ2 → bθL for some limiting value bθL.
b. For rF ≥ brF , S∆ becomes upward-sloping throughout.
i. At rF = brF , the unique root of S∆ = 0, bθ = bθL, the limiting value of bθ2.
ii. Thereafter, ∂bθ/∂rF > 0; while as rF becomes arbitrarily large, bθ → bθU for
some finite bθU > 1.
6.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 Substitute
η = μθ = μ
B
S
= μ nR
nU + nF
,
into (8),
μnR = (1− α) δnM nU + nF
nU
.
Combine this equation with (7) and simplify,
nU =
1− α
α nF . (46)
Substitute this equation for nU into the fraction nF/ (nU + nF ) gives just α.
Proof of Lemma 2 The first step is to use (3) and (4) to write
nR = 1−H + nF . (47)
Then, by (46) and (47),
θ = S
B
=
nU + nF
nR
=
1−α
α nF + nF
1−H + nF =
nF
α (1−H + nF ) . (48)
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Solve the equation for nF ,
nF =
θα (1−H)
1− θα . (49)
Next, by (7) and (3),
μnR = δ (1− nU − nR) .
Rearrange and then substitute from (46) and (47),
(μ+ δ) (1−H + nF ) = δ
µ
1− 1− αα nF
¶
.
Solve the equation for nF ,
nF = αδH − μ (θ) (1−H)δ + μ (θ)α . (50)
Setting the LHSs of (49) and (50) equal yields (11). Implicitly diﬀerentiating yields
a negative partial derivative. From (11), eθU is given by
δeθU + μ³eθU´ = δH
1−H , (51)
while eθL solves
δeθL + μ³eθL´
1− eθL = δH1−H . (52)
Given that the LHSs of both conditions are positive and finite for H < 1, eθL and eθU
are strictly positive and finite, and that eθL < 1.
Proof of Lemma 3 Comparative statics— Solve (11) for
α = δH − (1−H) (μ+ δθ)θδH . (53)
Substituting (53) into (49) yields
nF =
δH − (1−H) (μ+ δθ)
μ+ δθ . (54)
Substituting (54) into (46) and (47), respectively, yields
nU =
δH (θ − 1)− (1−H) (μ+ δθ)
μ+ δθ , (55)
nR =
δH
μ+ δθ . (56)
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Finally, by (3), (55), and (56),
nM =
μH
μ+ δθ . (57)
The comparative statics in the Lemma can be obtained by diﬀerentiating (54)-(57),
respectively, with respect to θ, and then noting that ∂eθ/∂α < 0.
Boundary values— At α = 0, by (10), nF = 0. Then, by (47), nR = 1 − H and
by (4), nM = H − nU . To obtain the equation for nU , substitute (51) into (55) and
simplify. For α = 1, by (8), nU = 0. And then by (47), nR = 1−H +nF . Thus, with
(3), nM = H − nF . The equation for nF is obtained by substituting (52) into (54)
and simplifying.
Proof of Lemma 5 First substitute from (4), and then from (53) and (57),
T = αδnM + (H − nM) η = δ ηHη + δ
1 + θ
θ − η (1−H) . (58)
Diﬀerentiating and simplifying,
∂T
∂θ =
δH
θ
"
θ∂η∂θ
Ãµ
1
η + δ
¶2
δ1 + θθ −
1−H
δH
!
− ηη + δ
1
θ
#
.
From (51),
1−H
δH ≤
1
θ (η + δ) ,
since θ ≤ eθU . Thus
∂T
∂θ ≤
δH
θ
"
θ∂η∂θ
Ãµ
1
η + δ
¶2
δ1 + θθ −
1
θ (η + δ)
!
− ηη + δ
1
θ
#
=
δH
θ2 (η + δ)
∙µδθ − η
η + δ
¶ ∂η
∂θ θ − η
¸
≤ δHθ2 (η + δ)
∙µδθ − η
η + δ
¶ ∂η
∂θ θ −
∂η
∂θ θ
¸
=
δH
θ2 (η + δ)
∙δθ + δ
η + δ
¸ ∂η
∂θ θ < 0,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that ∂μ/∂θ > 0 and that η = μ/θ.
But then ∂eθ/∂α < 0; hence ∂T/∂α > 0.
Proof of Lemma 6 Substituting from (4) and (58), (12) becomes
H − nM
αδnM + (H − nM) η .
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Diﬀerentiating with respect to α yields
δ (nM −H)nM − δHα∂nM∂α − (H − nM)2 ∂η∂θ ∂θ∂α
[αδnM + (H − nM) η]2 < 0,
since ∂nM/∂α > 0, ∂η/∂θ < 0, and ∂θ/∂α < 0.
Proof of Lemma 7 Substituting from (7), (8), and then (3),
1
μ +
1− α
η =
1− nM
δnM ,
a decreasing function of nM . But where ∂nM/∂α > 0, there must be a smaller average
TBM.
Proof of Lemma 8 Starting with θ = 0, μ = 0, while η →∞, so that S∆ becomes
limθ→0
µ
rH
rF
− 1− z
¶
η − 2 (δ + rH) z,
which is equal to positive infinity/a finite negative number/negative infinity if rF
≤
>
brF .
On the other hand, as θ→∞, η = 0 and μ→∞, so that S∆ becomes
limθ→∞μ− 2 (δ + rH) z, (59)
an expression that tends to positive infinity. Diﬀerentiating,
∂S∆
∂θ =
µ
rH
rF
− 1− z
¶ ∂η
∂θ +
∂μ
∂θ , (60)
which is guaranteed positive if rF ≥ brF . In this case, S∆ starts out at either negative
infinity or a finite negative number, is increasing throughout and eventually tends to
positive infinity. A unique θ then solves S∆ = 0. On the other hand, if rF < brF ,
S∆ starts out and ends up equal to positive infinity. It must therefore be initially
decreasing but eventually increasing. If the condition in the Lemma holds, (60)
changes sign just once. This can be shown by diﬀerentiating (60) and evaluating at
where it is equal to zero, which leads to an expression which is positive if the condition
holds. Then, at where (60) vanishes, S∆ is convex.
Proof of Lemma 10 By (21), limrF→0 S∆ = ∞. Thus, for arbitrarily small rF ,
S∗∆ > 0. This proves (a.i). Diﬀerentiating (21) and by the Envelope Theorem,
∂S∗∆
∂rF = −
rH
rF
η < 0.
37
This proves the first part of (a.ii). As to the second part, notice that
lim
rF→brF S∆ = μ− 2 (δ + rH) z, (61)
which is minimized at θ = 0, yielding a negative S∗∆ in the limit. Given that S∗∆ is con-
tinuous in rF , S∗∆ = 0 must hold before rF has reached brF . For (a.iii), diﬀerentiating
S∆ = 0 and for i = 1, 2,
∂bθi
∂rF =
rH
rF
η
∂S∆∂θ
.
Where S∆ is decreasing at bθ1 and increasing at bθ2, ∂bθ1/∂rF < 0 and ∂bθ2/∂rF > 0.
For (a.iv), notice that ∂S∆/∂θ, as given by (60), can only be negative as rF → brF if
θ → 0 in the interim. This proves bθ1 → 0 as rF → brF . The limiting value for bθ2 is
given by the solution to
μ
³bθ2´ = 2 (δ + rH) z.
Denote this as bθL. The positivity of ∂bθ/∂rF is due to the same reason for the positivity
of ∂bθ2/∂rF . The limiting value of bθ as rF becomes arbitrarily large is given by the
solution to
μ
³bθU´µ1− 1 + zbθU
¶
= 2 (δ + rH) z.
Given that the RHS is positive and finite, bθU is finite and satisfies bθU > 1 + z > 1.
This completes the proof of (b).
Proof of Proposition 1 To establish existence, we apply Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem to show that F has a fixed point. First, the unit interval is clearly a compact,
convex, and nonempty subset of the one-dimensional Euclidean space. Second, sinceeθ (α) is defined for all α ∈ [0, 1] and is positive-valued, and that bα is nonempty for
all θ > 0, F must be positive-valued and nonempty for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Whenever F is
multi-valued, F is the entire unit interval. Then it must be convex. Finally, with eθ
continuous and bα possessing a closed graph by virtue of the continuity of S∆, F must
have a closed graph as well. Then by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, F has a fixed
point.
Proof of Proposition 2 First define the graph of the bα (θ) correspondence as
being:
1. Nondecreasing over a given interval of θ if for any two θ0 and θ00 in the interval,
where θ0 < θ00, no element of bα (θ0) is strictly greater than any element of bα (θ00).
2. Decreasing at some θ0 if there exists an nonempty interval (θ0, θ00] where at least
one element of bα (θ0) is greater than all elements of bα (θ) for some θ ∈ (θ0, θ00].
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Then, if rF ≥ brF , the bα (θ) graph, as depicted in either Panel E or F of Figure 6, is
nondecreasing throughout. Then there can be one and only one {α, θ} pair at which
the downward-sloping eα (θ) in Figure 4 can meet a nondecreasing bα (θ). Next, by
(21), limrF→0 S∆ =∞. Hence for arbitrarily small rF , S∆ stays positive for all θ and
the bα (θ) graph is as depicted in Panel A of Figure 6. Clearly, the unique equilibrium
is α = 1 and θ = eθL.
Otherwise, the bα (θ) graph must be like the two depicted in Panels C and D in
Figure 6. In this case, by construction, for all θ ≤ bθ1, S∆ ≥ 0, so that 1 ⊂ bα (θ) for
all θ ≤ bθ1. Thus if eθL ≤ bθ1, α = 1 and θ = eθL is equilibrium. Given that eθU ≥ bθ1,
either that eθU ∈ hbθ1,bθ2i or that eθU > bθ2. In the first case, since 0 ⊂ bα (θ) for all
θ ∈
hbθ1,bθ2i where S∆ ≤ 0, α = 0 and θ = eθU is equilibrium. Next, consider the case
of eθU > bθ2. But if eθL ≤ bθ1, eθU > bθ2 > bθ1 ≥ eθL; i.e., bθ2 ∈ ³eθL,eθU´. Then there exists
an α ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies α = eα³bθ2´. At θ = bθ2, any α ∈ [0, 1] ⊂ bα³bθ2´. Thus,
α = eα³bθ2´ and θ = bθ2 is equilibrium. This proves that bθ1 ∈ heθL,eθUi is suﬃcient for
multiplicity given an bα (θ) graph as depicted in either Panel C or D in Figure 6. To
show that it is also necessary, notice that if bθ1 /∈ heθL,eθUi, the point at which bα (θ)
is decreasing, bα (θ) is nondecreasing throughout heθL,eθUi, and as in where rF ≥ brF ,
there can be just one point at which bα (θ) and eα (θ) intersect.
Proof of Proposition 3 Given that for small rF , the bα (θ) correspondence is given
by the one in Panel A of Figure 6, (a) follows immediately. For large rF , the bα (θ)
correspondence tends to the one in Panel F. In this case, θ can remain equal to eθL
only if the entire eα (θ) schedule lies to the right of bθU ; i.e., eθL ≥ bθU . Given thateθL < 1 (Lemma 2) and bθU > 1 (Lemma 9), the condition cannot hold. Hence, for
large rF , in equilibrium, α < 1 and θ > eθL. Next, if bθU ≥ eθU , in the limit when
rF becomes arbitrarily large, the downward-sloping eα must meet the horizontal axis
at where bα (θ) = 0, in which case equilibrium is α = 0 and θ = eθU . Otherwise, the
downward-sloping eα must meet the vertical segment of bα, yielding a bθ equilibrium,
where α > 0. This proves (b). For (c), note that as rF increases, the set of θ over
which 1 ⊂ bα (θ) shrinks and the set of θ over which 0 ⊂ bα (θ) expands. Parts (d)
and (e) are direct corollaries of (a.iii) and (b.ii) of Lemma 10, given that eα (θ) is
downward-sloping.
Proof of Proposition 4 We begin with showing that price in the search market in
the eθL equilibrium (pFS) is higher than in the bθ1 equilibrium (pH = pFS). First, if eθL
is equilibrium, pFS as given by (41) must exceed pH as given by (40), both evaluated
at θ = eθL. Next, it is straightforward but tedious to verify that with S∆ ≥ 0 and
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rF < rH , pH as given by (40) is decreasing in θ. Then the value of pH with S∆ ≥ 0
and θ = eθL exceeds the value with S∆ ≥ 0 and θ = bθ1. The latter, however, is
identical to pH with S∆ ≤ 0 as given by (34), when both expressions are evaluated
at S∆ = 0. Next, with ∂pH/∂θ < 0 as given by (25), search market housing price in
the bθ1 equilibrium must exceed that in the bθ2 equilibrium. The final comparison is
between search market prices in the bθ1 and eθU equilibria. At where θ = eθU , search
market housing price pH is given by (24). Diﬀerentiating with respect to θ yields an
expression whose sign is the opposite of the sign of
Φ ≡ 2 (δ + rH) θ + θη + 2 (δ + rH) θ∂η∂θ − (2δ + rH)
∂η
∂θ .
If μ is isoelastic, given by μ = θa, where a ∈ (0, 1), then η = θa−1. The above becomes
Φ = 2 (δ + rH) θ + θa − (2δ + rH) (a− 1) θa−2 + 2 (δ + rH) (a− 1) θa−1, (62)
whereby limθ→0Φ = limθ→∞Φ =∞. Diﬀerentiating,
∂Φ
∂θ = 2 (δ + rH) + aθ
a−1 − (2δ + rH) (a− 1) (a− 2) θa−3 + 2 (δ + rH) (a− 1)2 θa−2.
Set this derivative equal to 0 and substitute the result back into (62),
Φ = (1− a) θa−2 ¡θ2 − 2 (δ + rH) (2− a) θ − (a− 3) (2δ + rH)¢ .
This is the value for Φ at any local minimum, which is guaranteed positive if the
condition in the second part of the Proposition holds. This establishes that pH given
by (34) evaluated at α = 0 is decreasing in θ. Then pH at θ = eθU must fall below
the value of (34) evaluated at α = 0 and θ = bθ1. The latter when also evaluated
at S∆ = 0 is just the search market housing price at θ = bθ1. This completes the
proof that search market housing prices across steady-state equilibria can be ranked
inversely by the value of θ. Given that pFB = ηη+rF pFS, investment market housing
prices are ranked in the same way as in search market housing prices.
Proof of Proposition 8 Hold constant R and allow rH to increase; by (29),
∂S∗∆
∂rH = 2z < 0.
For large rH then, the bα (θ) graph cannot be like the ones in Panels A and B of
Figure 6. For rF ≥ brF (i.e., R ≤ 1 + z), so that there exists a unique root bθ to
S∆ = 0, ∂bθ/∂rH > 0, given that ∂S∆/∂rH < 0. By (29) and with R − 1 − z < 0,
limrH→∞ bθ = ∞. For rF < brF (i.e., R > 1 + z), there are two roots bθ1 and bθ2 to
S∆ = 0. Again, given that ∂S∆/∂rH < 0, ∂bθ1/∂rH < 0 and ∂bθ2/∂rH > 0. By (29)
and with R − 1 − z > 0, as rH → ∞, there can just be two θ that solves S∆ = 0,
equal to zero and infinity; thus limrH→∞bθ1 = 0 and limrH→∞bθ2 = ∞. Parts (a)-(d)
of the Propositions then follow immediately.
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Proof of Proposition 9 In a no-intermediate equilibrium, pH is given by (34),
evaluated at α = 0, which is independent of rF but decreasing in rH . This proves
the first part of (a). For the second part, substitute rF = rHR−1 into (41) and (42)
and diﬀerentiate. For (b), substituting rF = rHR−1 into (25) and (26), respectively,
yields,
pFS = pH =
(η + rHR−1) υ
(2δ + η + 2rH) rHR−1 , (63)
pFB =
ηυ
(2δ + η + 2rH) rHR−1 , (64)
both of which are decreasing in rH and θ. Solve S∗∆ = 0 from (29) for rH ,
rH =
(R− 1− z) η + μ
2z
− δ, (65)
and substituting the result into (63) and (64), respectively, gives
pFS = pH =
(2ηzR+ ηR− η − ηz + μ− 2δz) q
(ηR− η + μ) (ηR− η − ηz + μ− 2δz) , (66)
pFB =
2υz2Rη
(ηR− η + μ) (ηR− η − ηz + μ− 2δz) . (67)
Diﬀerentiating (67) with respect to θ and then substituting for η and ∂η/∂θ using
the identity η = μ/θ yield an expression whose sign is given by that ofµ
μ− θ∂μ∂θ
¶
(R− 1) (R− z − 1)−
µ
(2R− 2− z + θ) ∂μ∂θ + μ− 2zδ
¶
θ2.
The expression is strictly negative at R = 0 and R = 1 + z if the RHS of (65) is
positive. And then diﬀerentiating twice with respect to R yields
2
µ
μ− θ∂μ∂θ
¶
> 0,
given the concavity of μ. This establishes that pFB in (67) must be decreasing in θ for
R ∈ [0, 1 + z]. For pFS = pH , diﬀerentiating (66) with respect to θ and evaluating at
R = 0, 1, and 1+z, respectively, all yield a strictly negative expression as long as the
RHS of (65) is positive. This establishes that pFS = pH in (66) must be decreasing
in θ for R in neighborhoods of 0, 1, and 1 + z.
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